REVIEW ARTICLE Matters of Life and Death: The Middling Way as a New Buddhist Humanism? by Gardner Richard A.
REVIEW ARTICLE
Matters of Life and Death
The Middling Way as 
a New Buddhist Humanism?
Richard  A. Gardner
William R. LaFleur. Liquid Life: Abortion and Buddhism in Japan. Princeton: Prince­
ton University Press, 1992. xviii +  257 pages.
Helen Hardacre. Marketing the Menacing Fetus in Japan. Berkeley: University o f 
California Press, 1997. xxii +  310 pages.
THE LAST fifteen years have witnessed a growing interest on the part of Western scholars (as well as Japanese scholars and Buddhists) in the prac­
tice of mizuko kuyO, particularly as it relates to aborted fetuses. We now have 
two excellent books on the subject, William R. LaFleur’s Liquid Life  and 
Helen Hardacre’s Marketing the Menacing Fetus in Japan. The reasons for the 
interest in mizuko kuyo are not obscure. In the United States as well as in 
parts of Europe, abortion has been a major topic of scholarly, political, and 
religious debate. The practice has also quite naturally attracted the attention 
of those with both theoretical and existential interest in the issues of gender, 
sexuality, and the body. Rarely has a topic in the study of Japanese Buddhism 
engaged so many in such a variety of ways. While addressing an intrinsically 
important topic, these two books also provide an opportunity for reflecting a 
bit on the relation of descriptive and normative concerns in the study of Bud­
dhism.
While it can be questioned whether a purely descriptive, value free approach 
is ever possible, it is clearly difficult to maintain a position of neutrality when 
dealing with the range of issues related to abortion. Liquid Life goes beyond 
the bounds of a descriptive approach to enter into evaluative, normative, 
and moral arguments about particular religious orientations and practices.
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LaFleur even goes so far as to champion a Buddhist view of issues related to 
abortion, sexuality, and world population. LaFleur’s work here, I would sug­
gest, is indicative of a growing trend in Buddhist scholarship in the United 
States, a trend on the part of some scholars to more openly bring Buddhist 
values to the fore. Representing a more critical appraisal of the practice of 
mizuko kuyO, Marketing the Menacing Fetus also goes beyond the bounds of 
the descriptive. Both works raise a number of related issues: Is a descriptive, 
value free approach to religion possible? Is the distinction between descriptive 
and normative approaches at all meaningful and useful? How is the move 
from descriptive to more normative issues to be negotiated?
The cover of Liquid Life, which displays a photo of a number of small 
statues of JizO serving as memorial offerings for the spirits of mizuko, suggests 
the sort of incongruous feelings that many non-Japanese feel when first 
encountering the practice of mizuko kuyo. The JizO in the center of the photo 
wears a badge reading “ Let’s see E .T .” Foreigners who have lived in Japan 
for a time delight in explaining to uninitiated visitors that these often cutely 
dressed and equipped statues are linked with the spirits of dead children and, 
more likely than not, the spirits of aborted fetuses. As is suggested by the 
“ Let’s see E.T.”  badge here, foreigners generally feel a sweep of conflicting 
and incongruous reactions ranging from pathos to humor.1 While Japanese 
are more likely to point to the splendors of Buddhist art and architecture as 
somehow emblematic of Japanese Buddhism, more and more non-Japanese 
have come to see mizuko kuyo as an index to the religious sensibilities of 
Japanese Buddhism. Photos of mizuko JizO have even become emblematic of 
religion in contemporary Japan.2
1 The cover photo is prominently displayed in the following brief reviews: The 
Chronicle o f  Higher Education, January 20, 1993; Nick Bradbury, Far Eastern Eco­
nomic Review, March 11, 1993, p. 37 (the same review also appears in The Toronto 
Star, February 13, 1993); Asiaweek, April 28, 1993, p. 18; and Christopher Perrius, 
Mangajin, no. 27, June, 1993, pp. 16-18.
2 A  photo o f m izuko  JizO graces the cover o f Mark R. Mullins, Shimazono Susumu, 
and Paul L. Swanson, eds., Religion and Society in Modern Japan (Berkeley: Asian 
Humanities Press, 1993).
The questions raised in the Preface to Liquid Life suggest the scope of the 
book: How have Japanese religious traditions, and particularly Buddhist tradi­
tions, perceived abortion? How is the Buddhist proscription on taking life 
related to or reconciled with the practice of abortion? How do Buddhists 
relate their ethical ideals with the practical problems of everyday life? How 
might an examination and reflection on Japanese Buddhist conceptions and 
practices help Americans rethink, if not solve, their abortion dilemma? This is
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a relatively short book which covers a lot of ground both historically and in 
terms of the issues it raises. LaFleur offers more than a descriptive study of 
religion and abortion in Japan; he compares Buddhist and Christian perspec­
tives throughout and explicitly relates the Japanese case to the political and 
religious debate, controversy, and even violence which have surrounded the 
issue of abortion in the United States in recent years.
Only one of the reviewers of Liquid Life has explicitly noted that LaFleur 
combines here description and analysis with normative concerns. Richard Fox 
Young appreciatively notes that Liquid Life “ is not a product of scholarship 
fastidiously disengaged from the temporary North American debate on abor­
tion* * and “ is moderated by a straightforward distinction between detached, 
objective analysis and a mode of reflection more personally engaged and sub­
jective.**3 While LaFleur does not always offer extended argument for his 
value judgments, he does locate himself in an intellectual tradition (the tradi­
tion of American pragmatism as developed in the work of scholars such as 
Richard Rorty and Jeffrey Stout) which is more than merely subjective and 
allows one to at least partially understand the intellectual framework and 
assumptions from which LaFleur makes his judgments.4
Only the barest of overviews of the book is needed here.5 Part One of 
Liquid Life  focuses mainly on medieval Japan and attempts to uncover the 
cosmology, symbolic structures, and metaphors which shaped medieval Japa­
nese understandings of life and death, of passages between other worlds and 
this world, and thus also of fetuses, children, and the aged. The term “mizu- 
ko” is thus seen to embody cosmological references; it reflects notions that 
there is not a sharp demarcation between life and death, that fetuses and chil­
dren are not quite fully human and thus might be “ returned** (rather than 
simply “ killed’’) for possible future rebirth, etc. These notions are suggestively 
compared throughout with Christian notions to argue that the lines between 
life and death are configured differently in the West and in Japan. While this 
analysis of medieval Japan has drawn appreciative comments from almost all 
reviewers, some have raised questions about LaFleur’s application of these 
concepts to later periods of Japanese history.
3 Richard Fox Young, Monumenta Nippon ica, vol. 48, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 529-31.
4 Liquid Life, p. 212.
5 The following reviews offer basically appreciative summaries o f the book: Mark
Archer, Sunday Telegraph, January 24,1993; Donald Richie, “Abortion Opens a Win­
dow on Culture,’* Japan Times, March 16, 1993; William E. Deal, Japan Foundation 
Newsletter, vol. 21, no. 3 (November 1993): 28-30; Nitta Mitsuko frffljtT, ShQkyO to 
shakai vol. 1 (1995): 105-9; and Kathleen Morikawa, Asahi Evening News,
April 1-2, 1995.
I l l
TH E E A ST E R N  B U D D H IS T  X X X I, 1
Part Two offers an overview of historical problems and issues relating to 
abortion from the Edo period up to the present. It is LaFleur’s analysis o f 
the Edo period, however, which has generated the most critical comment. 
LaFleur analyzes here a “ debate” about mabiki (a term usually embracing 
both infanticide and abortion). Though using somewhat different arguments, 
both Confucian and Kokugaku scholars attributed positive religious value to 
fecundity and produced explicit attacks, which were in tune with government 
policies to increase the population, on the practice o f mabiki. Though at­
tacked by both Confucian and Kokugaku scholars, Buddhists remained rela­
tively silent. LaFleur reads this silence as indicating that Buddhist monks and 
intellectuals took a pragmatic approach, recognized the dilemmas people faced, 
and thus condoned or were “ soft on” the practice o f abortion.
At another level, LaFleur argues that the leveling off o f population growth 
in Japan from roughly 1721 to 1846 can, to a significant degree, be accounted 
for by the practice o f mabiki, a practice engaged in not just because of factors 
such as famine but also out o f a desire to preserve a certain standard o f liv­
ing. In terms of the larger argument o f the book, LaFleur suggests that the 
Japanese case shows that an acceptance of abortion does not lead down a slip­
pery slope to the moral degradation o f the family and society. Abortion has 
coexisted with strong family values in Japan, and might even be understood as 
having contributed to family values.
LaFleur’s reading o f the Buddhist “ silence” in the Edo period has drawn 
considerable questioning and criticism. While commending LaFleur for draw­
ing attention to the debate about mabiki (a topic he claims Japanese scholars 
have not paid sufficient attention to), Shimizu Kunihiko argues there is simply 
not enough evidence to make clear the Buddhist position and its relation to 
abortion in the Edo period. In this view, “ silence” is not to be interpreted.6 
George Tanabe has also offered a spirited attack on this portion o f the ar­
gument. Tanabe raises questions about LaFleur’s reading o f the evidence, 
presents some counter evidence, and suggests also that Buddhism, by defini­
tion, can only be against abortion.7 Tanabe here implicitly evokes a norma­
tive, orthodox Buddhism which renders the practice o f many Buddhists non­
Buddhist. Those interested in evaluating these criticisms may also consult 
LaFleur’s own response and Tanabe’s counterresponse.8
6 Shimizu Kunihiko Hikaku minzoku kenkyQ
f t ,  no. 9 (March 1994): 172-80.
7 George Tanabe, Japanese Journal o f  Religious Studies, vol. 21, no. 4 (Summer 
1994): 437-40. A shorter version o f  Tanabe’s review may also be found in Bulletin o f  
the H istory o f  Medicine, vol. 28, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 374-75.
8 William R. LaFleur, “ Silences and Censures: Abortion, History, and Buddhism in
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Questions have also been raised about demographic and statistical evidence. 
As noted, LaFleur argues that the leveling off of population growth between 
roughly 1721 and 1846 can be largely accounted for by the practice o f mabiki. 
Shimizu suggests that famine, epidemic, and infant mortality had a larger role 
to play here than LaFleur allows. Noriko Tsuya raises similar reservations, 
suggesting that famines and epidemics had significant roles to play and that 
regional studies o f population in Japan indicate that Malthusian factors, such 
as famine and epidemics, were often involved? Both have also suggested that 
greater attention needs to be given to regional variations within Japan. In a 
largely appreciative review, William Wetherall has also raised questions about 
LaFleur’s analysis o f changes in the rate o f abortion in postwar Japan.* 910
Japan: A Rejoinder to George Tanabe,”  Japanese Journal o f  Religious Studies, vol.
22, nos. 1-2 (Spring 1995): 185-96. Tanabe’s counterresponse, “ Sounds and Silences:
A Counterresponse,”  may be found in the same volume, pp. 197-200.
9 Noriko O. Tsuya, Contemporary Sociology: A  Journal o f  Reviews, vol. 23, no. 1 
(January 1994): 28-29.
10 William Wetherall, Times Literary Supplement, September 10, 1993.
” Ian Reader, Journal o f  Japanese Studies, vol. 21, no. 1 (1995): 195-200.
12 Kawahashi Noriko JIIWH6T. KOryO Joshi tandai kenkyU kiyO
Cross Culture, vol. 13 (March 1995): 371-78.
Questions have also been raised about LaFleur’s analysis of Buddhist atti­
tudes to abortion in contemporary Japan. While also questioning LaFleur’s 
reading o f the Buddhist “ silence” during the Edo Period, Ian Reader has con­
centrated his criticisms on LaFleur’s analysis o f Buddhism and abortion in 
contemporary Japan.11 For the most part, Reader simply asks for more evi­
dence. Reader complains, for instance, that LaFleur offers little about the atti­
tudes o f Buddhist temples today, hardly discusses the views o f the various 
Buddhist sects, has not conducted interviews of people going to temples and 
engaging in mizuko kuyo, and does not back up with data his claims that 
some temples are accommodating parishioners demands for mizuko rituals. 
Kawahashi Noriko has also questioned whether the symbolic logic o f mizuko 
rituals that LaFleur has extracted from textual sources actually corresponds to 
the lived experience o f women, especially since his study did not include inter­
views with women who participated in such rituals.12 Save for interviews with 
women who have undergone abortions and participated in mizuko kuyo 
rituals, LaFleur does offer at least some evidence regarding all of the above. 
Work does remain to be done, however, in amplifying and testing the prelimi­
nary interpretations LaFleur has offered here.
The above criticisms o f Liquid Life relate fairly clearly, for the most part, 
to problems of description, evidence, and analysis and do not directly engage
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normative issues. As suggested earlier, LaFleur explicitly engages normative 
issues and makes value judgments. At one level, LaFleur*s engagement o f 
normative issues is rather modest; he simply suggests that consideration of 
the ways in which the problem of abortion has been conceptualized in Japan 
might be o f significance for developing positions on abortion in the United 
States. Many reviewers have welcomed this aspect o f LaFleur’s work. At 
another level, LaFleur clearly takes a position against what he understands as 
the fecundist position, any position which attributes a religious value to fecun­
dity in and o f itself. LaFleur’s adoption o f pragmatism seems to work at a 
number of levels here: it allows for the recognition o f Buddhism as being prag­
matic, allows for the engagement of Japan as having something to teach, and 
serves to ground a position in the debate about abortion.
As already suggested, the move from a descriptive to normative approach is 
not without difficulties. The problem and one possible solution is clearly illus­
trated in an article by R. J. Zwi Werblowsky on mizuko kuyO which preceded 
the publication of Liquid Ltfef*  Werblowsky is clearly opposed to the prac­
tice o f mizuko kuyO in all o f  its forms and identifies some o f the factors ena­
bling the rise o f this “ new religion” as the greed o f the “ gynecologist mafia” 
and some Buddhist institutions, and the total lack o f any theory o f social prac­
tice within Buddhism.1 *4 At one point, Werblowsky poses a dilemma.
11 R. J. Zwi Werblowsky, ** M izuko KuyO: Notulae on the Most Important ‘New
Religion’ o f  Japan,”  Japanese Journal o f  Religious Studies, vol. 18, no. 4 (December
1991): 295-354.
14 One review o f Liquid Life actually presents LaFleur as saying basically the same 
thing as Werblowsky, that Buddhism and the medical establishment in Japan are fun­
damentally corrupt, and reads more like a summary o f  Werblowsky than a review o f 
LaFleur. Thomas Crump, “ Floating it away,”  London Review o f  Books, October 7, 
1993, p. 7.
15 Werblowsky, p. 329.
The above excursus was in every sense a derailment—mainly because 
a historian o f religion is not supposed to give free rein to his sar­
casms, to ridicule belief in souls or the offering o f prayers “ for the 
quick and the dead” (including mizuko), to preach secularism, or to 
present one religious attitude as superior to another. On the con­
trary, he is professionally committed to an understanding of, and sym­
pathy for, all that moves human beings at the deepest level of their ex­
perience. But sometimes derailments have their uses.15
Werblowsky recognizes here that the sympathetic, value-free stance o f the 
historian o f religion or religious studies scholar does not allow him to make
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any value judgments even though he clearly feels moved to make judgments. 
Werblowsky seems to solve the dilemma by recognizing the historian of 
religion’s disciplinary restraints but deciding to simply go ahead and say what 
he wants to say. There is little in the way o f intellectual grounding offered for 
his judgments aside from some references to human rights, Freud, and the 
superiority o f counseling to Buddhist ritual.
The questions o f whether, how, and on what basis to criticize religious 
practices also emerges, though often implicitly, in LaFleur’s work and the 
response to it. LaFleur himself clearly disapproves o f entrepreneurial temples 
which seem to be engaged in frightening women with tales o f tatari in order to 
instill feelings o f guilt and increase the demand for their often expensive 
rituals. No argument is presented here and perhaps none is needed; only one 
reviewer raises an issue here. While conceding there is some manipulation, 
Reader accuses LaFleur o f assuming, like the mass media, that the new tem­
ples established for the practice o f mizuko kuyO are manipulating and exploit­
ing people. This not only fails to consider “ the strong feelings” priests o f such 
temples might have but also “ presents a rather derogatory picture o f  those 
who go to temples to do mizuko services.” 16 The implied moral stance here is 
that scholars o f religion should not write anything to offend the feelings or sen­
sibilities o f members o f religions they write about. More characteristic is the 
response o f Kawahashi who criticizes LaFleur not for making a value judg­
ment here but for not stressing enough the negative aspects o f mizuko kuyo. It 
is difficult to please everyone.
One o f the more interesting and valuable o f LaFleur’s arguments involving 
normative issues concerns the notion o f guilt. He argues that some feelings 
of guilt may have a positive moral value.17 LaFleur’s argument is o f value 
because it serves to highlight what appears to be a wide spread normative 
assumption that guilt is bad. It is refreshing to hear someone argue that a degree 
of guilt may not be all that bad. While some base their opposition to mizuko 
practices on the presence o f guilt, none o f the reviewers engage LaFleur’s argu­
ment here.1’ Kawahashi implies, for instance, that mizuko practices are bad to 
the extent that they involve the presence o f guilt and gives some interesting 
examples o f contemporary Buddhists working to alter mizuko rituals so wom­
en are not made to feel guilt. Kawahashi*s article also illustrates how the aca-
“ Reader, p. 199.
17 Liquid Life, p. 154.
11 Based on his experience reading messages to mizuko written on ema Reader does 
question, however, whether women involved in mizuko rituals actually feel much guilt 
and fear towards mizuko.
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demic discussions of Buddhism are beginning to influence the practice of 
Buddhism.
Tanabe, Reader, and Kawahashi all charge LaFleur with giving insufficient 
space to the “voices” o f Buddhists, particularly those o f Buddhist women. 
Other reviewers, however, have praised the book for bringing the voices of 
women to the surface.19 At one level, the call for more voices is simply a call 
for more evidence. The metaphor o f “ voice” is now, however, a very popular 
one and the use o f it carries moral overtones. To fail to give sufficient atten­
tion to the voices o f “others” (particularly outsiders and the marginalized) is 
to participate in systems o f oppression. While the term “ voice” is often part 
of a well articulated theoretical position, it has also come to be wielded in an 
almost amuletic fashion requiring little explication. In and of itself, the mere 
presence o f “ voices” does little to resolve larger issues.
19 See here the following appreciative reviews, one in a Buddhist and the other in a 
feminist journal: Yvonne Rand, Tricycle: The Buddhist Review, vol. 2, no. 3 (Spring 
1993): 93-95, and Ann Waltner, Signs: Journal o f  Women in Culture and Society, vol. 
21, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 759-62
20 Elizabeth Harrison, “ Women’s Responses to Child Loss in Japan: The Case of 
mizuko ku yO " Journal o f  Feminist Studies in Religion, vol. 11, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 67- 
94.
21 Ibid., p. 74, n. 8.
The term “voice” also figures in a recent, valuable article by Elizabeth 
Harrison which engages LaFleur’s work, though only briefly in a footnote. 
Harrison explicitly opposes the blanket, critical attacks on mizuko kuyO by 
the Japanese mass media, academics, and feminists.20 She also opposes LaFleur 
by reading him as arguing that “ women perform the practice out o f guilt 
over their abortions, making them ready prey for the abortion business.” 21 
Though acknowledging the existence o f exploitative practices at some tem­
ples, Harrison opposes these positions because they refuse to sufficiently 
acknowledge women’s voices and the active role women sometimes take in the 
construction o f some mizuko rituals. Harrison then presents two detailed, fas­
cinating case studies o f women who were actively engaged in initiating such 
rituals. While not directly engaging normative issues, Harrison’s main point 
seems to be that approaches viewing all women engaged in mizuko rituals as 
being manipulated simply misconstrue the reality o f women’s lives and rob, 
indeed, at least some women of their integrity.
A response to Harrison’s article, however, clearly articulates a strong nor­
mative position. Igeta Midori criticizes Harrison for naively seeing autono­
mous agency in the action of some women involved in developing mizuko 
rituals, and opposes not only all practice of mizuko kuyO but Buddhism in
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general for manipulating women by fostering guilt.22 Though not clearly devel­
oped in such a short space, Igeta at least alludes to and evokes a feminist theo­
ry o f society which values individuality and self-determination and aims at the 
“deconstruction” o f culture and society. This is very clearly a theoretical posi­
tion which is willing and able to offer value judgments on many, if not all, so­
cial practices, religious and otherwise, and does not shrink from making what 
might be taken as “ derogatory” comments about the beliefs, practices, and 
“voices” o f others.
22 Igeta Midori, “A Response,” Journal o f  Feminist Studies in Religion, vol. 11, 
no. 2 (Fall 1995): 95-100.
23 For a more detailed overview of these chapters, see my review in Monumenta Nip- 
ponica 55, no. 2 (1997): 283-86.
In Marketing the Menacing Fetus in Japan, Helen Hardacre provides the 
most comprehensive study to date o f mizuko kuyO in contemporary Japan. 
Though presenting her study as largely complementary to that o f LaFleur, 
Hardacrc’s work differs in significant ways. In contrast to LaFleur, Hardacre 
places more emphasis on the discontinuities between present and past and on 
the variety o f practices existing in the present. Drawing on traditions of 
feminist scholarship, Hardacre attempts to trace the different meanings at­
tached to abortion in the context o f changing sexual, ritual, and social prac­
tices involving the negotiation of power between men and women. Hardacre 
argues that the practice of mizuko kuyO is largely a creation o f the 1970s. 
While LaFleur locates positive value in some aspects o f the ideas and practices 
surrounding mizuko kuyO, Hardacre finds little if any value in the contempora­
ry practice.
The first three chapters o f Marketing the Menacing Fetus provide an analy­
sis o f the practice and conceptualization of abortion from the Edo period 
up to the present.23 Chapter 1 presents the reproductive life as having been 
subjected to processes of deritualization and then medicalization. Hardacre 
argues that pregnancy and childbirth in the Edo period were linked with pollu­
tion beliefs, served as a rite o f passage for women, and were supervised by mid­
wives who had a semi-religious status and function. While infanticide and 
abortion were opposed by the government, the practices were widely tolerated 
and did not draw extended criticism by religious institutions. Hardacre finds 
little evidence, however, for the ritualization o f abortion itself and for key ele­
ments o f contemporary mizuko kuyO such as the belief in the spirits of abort­
ed fetuses as being vengeful or malevolent. An examination o f legends con­
cerning Yflten Shdnin (1637-1718) reveal some of the Edo “ common sense” 
about men and women involved in abortion. The tales concerning abortion 
made use o f the stock types o f the Callous Man and the Foolish Woman and
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directed criticism at both men and women. The rise of the Meiji state wit­
nessed an ongoing process of deritualizing reproduction, the passage of laws 
opposing abortion and infanticide, and the gradual incorporation of the activi­
ties of midwives into the state bureaucracy. In the postwar period an increas­
ing medicalization of the reproductive process and the role of midwives com­
pleted the deritualization of the reproductive process.
Chapters 2 and 3 provide a more detailed reading of the practice and concep­
tualization of abortion in the postwar period as they relate to economic 
developments, government policies, and changes in the relation of men and 
women. Of particular importance here is Hardacre’s analysis of the “mizuko kuyo 
boom” which developed in the mid-1970s. This boom was marked by the 
appearance of a group of spiritualists tending to diagnose women’s suffering as 
being the result of malevolent mizuko, the emergence of an understanding of 
the fetus in a fetocentric fashion (as having an existence independent of the 
mother and which seems to have been encouraged by fetal photography), a sen­
sationalized treatment of both of these developments in the mass media, and 
the emergence of an “ occult boom” and New New Religions embracing pes­
simistic views compatible with the notion of malevolent mizuko. As opposed 
to earlier periods, the issue of abortion tended to be individualized with pri­
mary responsibility being put on the woman.
Hardacre also argues that mizuko kuyO is a minority practice and has been 
subject to serious study and moral debate in Buddhist communities in Japan. 
Most Japanese and established religious institutions took a negative view of 
the mizuko boom. According to a 1986 survey, only 46% of religious institu­
tions practiced some form of mizuko kuyO. Hardacre also argues that only 
15-20% of women having had abortions seem to have participated in rituals 
memorializing the fetus in some form. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of eight 
narratives (five by women, three by men) which illustrate some of the ways 
abortion is part of the sexual negotiations and erotic exchanges between men 
and women. Published as part of a book opposing efforts to limit access to 
abortion, these accounts also document conceptualizations of abortion having 
nothing to do with the assumptions of mizuko kuyO. Much of the study of the 
practice in Japan, including that undertaken from a Buddhist perspective, has 
been highly critical.24
In many ways, the most exciting part of this book is the concluding two 
chapters which examine how mizuko kuyO is practiced at Buddhist, Shu- 
gendO, and Shinto sites. A general pattern emerges here of women approach­
ing religious institutions, mostly Buddhist, for ritual services after having
24 Sec here the extensive bibliography contained in Marketing the Menacing Fetus, 
pp. 266-67, notes 6-11.
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been inspired by spiritualists and the media. Many Buddhist temples simply 
refuse to perform ritual services for mizuko. Others try to accommodate the 
requests o f parishioners in some fashion, and yet others clearly develop mizuko 
rituals to exploit the economic opportunity. While Harrison has argued for 
the positive value o f women’s efforts here, Hardacre views almost all mizuko 
practices as misogynist and manipulative.
Though Hardacre does not highlight this point, these cases studies might 
well be read as moral dramas, as accounts o f the moral dilemmas faced by 
Buddhist priests and other religious leaders. Hardacre suggests how many Bud­
dhist priests and temples are caught in the interplay o f a variety of often incom­
patible factors—the desire on the part o f religious figures and spiritualists 
without an institutional affiliation for a stable base o f clients, both positive 
and negative reactions to the sensationalized accounts o f the dangers of 
mizuko in the mass media, sincere efforts on the part o f women to come to 
terms with the traumas provoked by experiences o f abortion, the recognition 
by some Buddhist priests that mizuko kuyo has little textual precedent in 
canonical Buddhism, the need o f some economically weak temples to attract 
new paying clients, attempts by some to promote local tourism/pilgrimage 
and local businesses, and the need to hide or mute mizuko kuyo practices 
because o f negative reactions by some parishioners.
There is clearly a normative dimension to Hardacre’s analysis. The practice 
of mizuko kuyo is characterized throughout as misogynist, as being fueled by 
media sensationalism, as tending to place sole responsibility on individual 
women, as being cultivated by some institutions and religious figures for 
largely economic reasons, as reflecting a pessimistic and fatalistic religious out­
look, and as often contributing to or manifesting a less than equal relation of 
men and women. Hardacre does not, however, develop at length the normative 
vision underlying these judgments. To note this point is not to deny that 
Hardacre handles the materials and issues here with great care.
In his own review o f Marketing the Menacing Fetus, LaFleur not only 
highlights (perhaps overly so at places) the differences between his work and 
Hardacre’s but also argues that normative concerns lead Hardacre to miscon­
strue the data.25 LaFleur questions both Hardacre’s argument that a fetocen- 
tric position developed only recently in Japan and her conceptualization o f 
abortion in which the fetus is granted no independent existence apart from a 
woman. Though there is room for debate on Hardacre’s position here, 
LaFleur reads Hardacre as adopting a position of “ feto-negationism” in con­
trast to feto-centrism. An unambiguous denial o f independent existence to the
25 William R. LaFleur, “Abortion, Ambiguity, and Exorcism,’’ The Journal o f  Bud­
dhist Ethics, vol. 5 (1998) (an electronic journal found at http:/jbe.la.psu.edu/).
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fetus has been, o f course, part o f arguments in North America for the right of 
abortion. In contrast, LaFleur insists on the ambiguous status o f the fetus as 
is reflected in the term “ mizuko”  itself. As part of his counterargument, 
LaFleur asks why rituals have been performed for mizuko in the past if there 
was not a conception of mizuko having at least some degree independent exis­
tence prior to the appearance o f the fetocentric position.
As suggested at the outset o f this review, studies of mizuko kuyO raise a 
perennial issue in the study o f Buddhism and religion itself, the relation o f 
what might be termed descriptive/analytic and normative concerns. As wit­
nessed in the development o f the history o f religions (and more recently 
religious studies), the study of religion in the modem period has advanced in 
large part by taking a neutral, “ objective” stance to religion with an empha­
sis, to borrow a term from Paul Ricoeur, on the hermeneutics o f recovery. 
The major objective has been to free the study o f religion, particularly non­
Christian religions, from the normative concerns of both theology and philos­
ophy (Christian or otherwise) and later to oppose what were seen as reduc­
tive social scientific approaches engaged in the hermeneutics o f suspicion. 
If there was an explicit value orientation in the study of religion, it was that 
there was value in attempting to bracket one’s own commitments in an effort 
to understand non-Christian religions such as Buddhism in their own terms. 
Bracketing one’s own value orientation, whether one was Christian or Bud­
dhist, became the price for participating in the scholarly academic study o f 
religion.
As Werblowsky makes clear with disarming honesty, a topic such as mizuko 
kuyO poses a dilemma for scholars oriented towards the hermeneutics o f recov­
ery. Though it is hard to imagine a topic in the study o f religion which does 
not raise normative issues at some level, the practice of mizuko kuyO so clearly 
raises moral issues directly concerning people throughout the world that the 
issues cannot simply be bracketed away. How have those who have written on 
mizuko kuyO responded to the dilemma posed by Werblowsky?
Most have followed traditional patterns in responding to this dilemma. One 
response has been to simply state that there are parts o f mizuko kuyO, such as 
its entrepreneurial aspect, that one finds repugnant and then to go on to pre­
sent a largely descriptive account of mizuko kuyO.26 This simply enacts rather 
than engages the dilemma. Another response is to simply adopt an established 
normative position from within a religious tradition. This is the position taken 
by many Japanese Buddhists writing about mizuko kuyO as well as by Tanabe
26 See, for instance, Hoshino Eiki and Takeda DOshd, “Mizuko KuyO and Abortion 
in Contemporary Japan,” in Mullins et al., Religion and Modern Society in Japan, pp. 
171-90.
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in his review o f LaFleur.27 * Yet another approach, as seen in several o f the rev­
iews o f LaFleur*s book, is to appeal with little argument to at least implicitly 
normative notions such as “ voices’* or a condemnation o f  guilt. A related ap­
proach is to adopt a theoretical approach embodying normative judgments. 
In recent years, many scholars o f religion and Buddhism have adopted nor­
mative positions derived from the varieties o f Neo-Marxism, critical theory, 
feminism, or cultural studies. This approach is illustrated by some Japanese 
feminists such as Igeta who condemn mizuko kuyO as part o f a larger system 
of oppression directed against women in Japan. Most often a theoretical 
framework embodying normative positions is cited but not argued. Hardacre, 
for instance, grounds her approach in traditions o f feminist scholarship but 
presents no explicit discussion o f the assumptions or value orientation o f 
those traditions.
27 For a bibliographic survey of works in Japanese on mizuko kuyO, see Hardacre, 
Menacing Fetus, p. 7, notes 6-11.
24 “ History of Religions and a New Humanism,” History o f  Religions 1 (1961): 1-8.
29 Mircea Eliade, “A New Humanism,”  The Quest: History and Meaning in 
Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 2 (a slightly expanded ver­
sion of the original essay).
The approach taken by LaFleur differs from all o f these options. LaFleur’s 
work might be viewed, indeed, in relation to the vision of a new humanism 
Mircea Eliade proposed almost forty years ago in the lead article o f the inau­
gural issue o f the journal History o f  Religions.™ In this essay, Eliade en­
visioned a new humanism, based on the researches o f the history o f religions, 
which would allow the religious and cultural values o f Asia and “primitive** 
peoples to challenge and enrich the cultural and religious life o f the West.
But if the peoples o f the West are no longer the only ones to “ make** 
history, their spiritual and cultural values will no longer enjoy the 
privileged place, to say nothing o f unquestioned authority, that they 
enjoyed some generations ago. These values are now being analyzed, 
compared and judged by non-Westemers. On their side, Westerners 
are being increasingly led to study, reflect on, and understand the 
spiritualities o f Asia and the archaic world. These discoveries and 
contacts must be extended through dialogues. But to be genuine and 
fruitful, a dialogue cannot be limited to empirical and utilitarian lan­
guage. A  true dialogue must deal with the central values in the cul­
tures o f the participants.29
Clearly presented as a form o f humanism, what Eliade was envisioning here 
was something different than the interreligious dialogue which has prolifer-
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ated in recent years. Unlike Werblowsky, Eliade also envisioned the history of 
religions as leading to a dialogue or debate about normative issues. Not a few 
of Eliade’s colleagues and students over the years have expressed uncertainty 
over just what it was Eliade was envisioning in this essay. For others, such as 
LaFleur, Eliade’s essay was one of the reasons they were drawn to the study of 
the history of religions.
At least part of LaFleur’s argument is built on endorsing a Buddhist view of 
things which is linked to recent works in the tradition of American prag­
matism. LaFleur is concerned here not just with the practice of mizuko kuyO 
but with Buddhist evaluations of the human reproductive process in general. 
In particular, LaFleur is concerned with suggesting that at least some aspects 
of the Buddhist tradition represent a position which might be opposed to what 
he has called the fecundist position. As represented by some Confucian and 
Shinto thinkers of the Edo period and some Catholic thinkers in the contem­
porary period, the fecundist position attributes positive religious value to the 
reproduction of human life. In contrast to this position, LaFleur presents Bud­
dhism as having offered an anti-fecundist position and as providing resources 
for developing an anti-fecundist position which would be of value in address­
ing contemporary problems, such as overpopulation, and would not necessar­
ily be a position limited to committed Buddhists.
For the most part, however, LaFleur is not concerned with championing a 
Buddhist view in any straightforward sense but with extracting some general 
principles from Buddhist examples.30 Throughout Liquid Life and his review 
of Hardacre, LaFleur compares concepts and practices in Japanese Buddhism 
with concepts and practices in North America as a way of exposing Western as­
sumptions and suggesting alternative ways of approaching the problem of 
abortion and public moral debate in general. In his review of Hardacre, for in­
stance, LaFleur questions Hardacre’s criticism of Japanese Buddhist leaders 
for not taking a clearer moral stance on the practice of abortion. LaFleur sug­
gests that Hardacre’s position here reflects an assumption, perhaps derived 
from Christianity, that religious leaders should take a firm position of moral 
leadership. LaFleur argues both that Buddhist clergy have rarely exerted such 
strong moral leadership and that there is value in the refusal of such leaders to 
take an unequivocal moral stance on complex matters. Through the ambigui­
ty it generates, such a refusal allows for a considerable amount of freedom 
and responsibility on the part of laity and also serves to avoid a polarization
M Compare here Galen Amstutz's stimulating critical history o f  Shin Buddhism 
which concludes with a relatively straightforward assertion o f Shin Buddhist values. 
Galen Amstutz, Interpreting Am ida: H istory and Orientalism in the Study o f  Pure 
Land Buddhism  (Albany: State University o f  New York Press, 1997).
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o f moral debates. LaFleur does not address here, however, the possible down­
side o f ambiguity nor engage those, such as Oe KenzaburO, who argue that an 
overfondness o f ambiguity lies at the heart o f many o f the social, political, 
and moral problems plaguing contemporary Japanese society.
Importantly, LaFleur also might be read as developing and advocating a par­
ticular style o f moral argument and thought. Following Jeffrey Stout’s applica­
tion of Claude Levi-Strauss’s notion o f the bricoleur to the problem of moral 
reasoning, LaFleur analyzes aspects o f Japanese moral reasoning about abor­
tion as “moral bricolage.” n  LaFleur locates in the Japanese tradition, in 
other words, a non-dogmatic style o f moral reasoning which he links with 
American pragmatism and advocates as a way o f avoiding polarized moral de­
bates. In his review o f Hardacre (where, somewhat ironically, he sometimes 
polarizes the differences between himself and Hardacre), he thus advocates “ a 
middling way”—which is not necessarily Buddhist—between the feto-centric 
and feto-negationist positions.12 The notion o f “ moral bricolage”  also serves 
as a sort of bridge in at least three senses: it is a concept used to analyze Bud­
dhist moral reasoning, provides a link between some forms o f Japanese moral 
reasoning and developments in American pragmatism, and seems to provide 
LaFleur with a method for moving from descriptive to normative concerns. 
This last point, however, is not explicitly developed in Liquid Life.
A problem and approach related in some ways to those o f LaFleur can be 
seen in some o f the articles in a recently published conference volume on Bud­
dhism and ecology.31 23 In the Series Foreword, Tucker and Grim clearly state a 
normative judgment and intent; the earth is facing ecological crisis and it is 
inevitable that people “ will draw on the conceptual resources of the religious 
traditions o f the world” in an effort to construct a “ more effective environ­
mental ethics.” 34 In the same way that LaFleur draws on Buddhism without 
necessarily arguing for a Buddhist position, Tucker and Grim also envision 
the world’s religions as providing resources for constructing an environmental
31 Liquid L ife, p. 12. Jeffrey Stout, Ethics after Babel: The Languages o f  Morals 
and Their Discontents (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988).
32 While the term “ middling way”  has been dropped from the final version o f  
LaFleur’s essay, I believe it captures his understanding o f  the positive value o f  the am­
biguous stance taken by many Buddhist (particularly Japanese Buddhist) leaders on 
many moral issues.
33 Mary Evelyn Tucker and Duncan RyQken Williams, eds., Buddhism and Ecology: 
The Interconnection o f  Dharma and Deeds, Religions o f  the World and Ecology 
Series, eds. Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim (Cambridge: Harvard University Cen­
ter for the Study o f  World Religions, 1997).
34 p. xix.
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ethic without that ethic necessarily being tied to a particular religious tradition 
or even being religious. The approach taken here might well be analyzed as a 
version of LaFleur’s notion of moral bricolage.
As Duncan RyQken Williams notes in his introduction, the participants 
in the conference included both “ scholars of Buddhism and environmentally 
engaged Buddhists'* (with some individuals, of course, being both). The 
essays in the volume include both descriptive and normative dimensions. And 
while suggesting how Buddhist ideas and practices might provide resources for 
responding to the environmental crisis, there is little in the way of idealized 
apologetics for Buddhism and a good deal of confrontation with the fact that 
Buddhism has served at times to work against environmental concerns in 
Japan and elsewhere. The lead essay by Lewis Lancaster also self-consciously 
reflects on the difficulties of what might be termed “ moral bricolage ”  the 
difficulties involved in attempting to draw on Buddhist ideas and practices 
from the past to inform contemporary concerns. There are also recognitions 
throughout the volume of the difficulties of combining descriptive, historical 
studies and normative concerns.
There are, I think, positive signs here. At least a notable number of Bud­
dhist scholars, be they Buddhist or not, seem to be willing and even eager to 
begin stepping across the line that scholars such as Werblowsky have drawn 
between history of religions and more normative concerns. There is nothing par­
ticularly new, of course, in venturing across this line in and of itself; the line 
has a long history of being wittingly and unwittingly crossed. What is note­
worthy here is the degree of self-consciousness that some of these efforts in­
volve. Not reducible to traditional Buddhist apologetics, LaFleur’s effort is of 
particular interest. One might even ask whether LaFleur’s notion of moral 
bricolage might form a sort of Middling Way for relating descriptive and nor­
mative concerns in the study of Buddhism and religion itself. It would be of 
great interest if LaFleur, having come this far, would go on to even more 
explicitly address the question of the relation of history of religions and nor­
mative concerns.35 Perhaps embedded in his work on mizuko kuyO is one 
method by which historians of religion might negotiate a move towards norma­
tive concerns.
35 There is a tradition o f historians o f religions explicitly engaging the issue in the lat­
ter stages o f  their careers. Towards the end o f  their careers, both Joachim Wach and 
his disciple Joseph M. Kitagawa (who was in turn one o f  LaFleur’s teachers) turned 
their attention to normative issues.
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